Eleutherological-Conjecturalist Libertarianism: a One-Page Guide by Lester, J. C.
New-Paradigm Libertarianism: a Very Brief Explanation
1
 
 
J. C. Lester 
 
 
The Philosophical Problem 
 
Mainstream private-property libertarianism—in its various forms—is severely 
philosophically confused. It conflates conceptions or theories of rights, consequences, 
property, and supporting ‘justifications’. And this is all without any theory of liberty (an 
eleutherology), which is as absurd as if utilitarianism were to have no theory of utility. 
 
The New-Paradigm Libertarian Solution 
 
Applying critical-rationalist epistemology. As Karl Popper (1902-1994) explained, there are 
no supporting ‘justifications’ of any empirical theories (because they have infinite 
implications, which finite and theory-laden evidence can test but not support) or any 
propositions (because arguments entail infinite regresses, or circularities, or 
dogmatic/‘axiomatic’ starting assumptions). There are only conjectures, or assumptions, 
testable within frameworks of conjectures. Hence libertarianism, like all theories, is 
unjustifiable. However, it can still be conjecturally explained and defended—philosophically 
and social scientifically—in terms of theory, practice, and morals. 
 
Not choosing between libertarian rights and welfare consequences (or any of the other usual 
candidates). These two main moral and practical desirables have no systematic theoretical or 
practical clashes (this is the implicit ‘classical-liberal compatibilist thesis’). This can be 
explained and defended by philosophy and by the social sciences, especially economics’ 
analysis of free-market efficiency. However, the libertarian conjecture needs to be explained 
and defended in terms of all defensible desirables. (A perceived ‘successful’ conjectural 
explanation and defence is still not a—logically impossible—supporting ‘justification’; it is 
merely seen as ‘squared with’ known criticisms so far.) 
 
An explicit, non-moral, non-propertarian, abstract, theory of interpersonal liberty. People 
not initiating constraints on each other’s preference-satisfactions: ‘The absence of proactively 
imposed interpersonal costs’. After explaining and defending this theory of liberty it can be 
applied to contingent circumstances to deduce all the broad, practical, positive rules of having 
maximum interpersonal liberty, which rules can only then—for greater efficiency—be 
instituted as property: self-ownership, physical property, intellectual property, minimising 
clashes of liberty, rectifications of infractions, etc. An abstract theory of interpersonal liberty 
is needed at the centre of the libertarian conjecture. 
 
The Procedural Implications 
 
Consequently, it is necessary for comprehensive and coherent private-property libertarian 
theories to always be mindful of the following distinctions and to proceed as follows: 
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 For further explanation see the relevant publications of J. C. Lester since 1991: 
https://philpapers.org/profile/409254. 
1) Conjecturally explain and defend a non-moral, non-propertarian, abstract theory of 
interpersonal liberty as capturing the relevant concept. 
 
2) Conjecturally explain and defend what rules are positively entailed by applying this theory 
to normal contingent circumstances (e.g., each person has ultimate control of the body that 
he, more or less, is). Entailed positive rules can then be instituted as property (e.g., self-
ownership). 
 
3) Conjecturally explain and defend 1 and 2 normatively: in terms of morals, rights, values, 
justice, desirability, etc. 
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